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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Monday August 15, 1977

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**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Monday, 15 August 1977

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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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RHODESIA: Nkomo's Position

*[redacted] //Rhodesian nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo is in the US after visits to several Caribbean countries including Cuba. Nkomo wants to discuss his views on a Rhodesian settlement with US officials. Despite his public emphasis on the military struggle against the Smith government and the recent build-up of his Zimbabwe African People's Union guerrilla force, Nkomo remains interested in the Anglo-US settlement effort.//*

*[redacted] //Nkomo, who is nominally allied with Robert Mugabe in the Patriotic Front, has more political and diplomatic experience than any of the other nationalist leaders. He draws most of his support from a small ethnic minority but has political stature inside Rhodesia because he has been the foremost nationalist leader since the 1950s. In recent months, Nkomo appears to have strengthened his position vis-a-vis some of the other leaders:*

--Unlike some of his rivals, he is the unchallenged leader of his faction; the leadership of Mugabe's faction is badly divided.

--He is regarded as the senior partner in the Patriotic Front by some of the front-line African presidents.

--His military position has been enhanced by a rapid build-up of his guerrilla forces, which may now have up to 9,000 trained fighters based in Zambia.

--ZAPU has been receiving increased military aid from the USSR, which has supported Nkomo's faction for many years.//

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[REDACTED] //Nkomo is a pragmatist and is not wedded to the USSR or to communist ideology. He has been involved in numerous business ventures, and he is one of the wealthiest Rhodesian blacks.//

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[REDACTED] //Although Nkomo probably gained a pledge of additional aid for ZAPU during his recent visit to Havana, the visit probably will not lead to any significant increase in the modest level of Cuban material assistance for Nkomo's guerrilla force. He probably hoped that by stopping in Havana before coming to the US he would remind US officials of the military alternative to a negotiated settlement.//

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[REDACTED] //Nkomo may be growing more interested in settlement talks because of increasing concern over the possibility of fighting with rival nationalists after the white government relinquishes power. Nkomo's alliance with Mugabe has little substance, and the two factions view each other as rivals for power in any future black government. Despite the efforts of the front-line presidents to foster military cooperation between the two groups, hostility between them appears to be increasing, and there seems little chance of any real cooperation.//

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[REDACTED] //Nkomo does not foresee or desire a purely military solution to the Rhodesian problem. Nkomo's guerrilla force is still numerically inferior to Mugabe's. There have been indications that, rather than risking heavy casualties against government forces, Nkomo would like to conserve his guerrillas for possible later use against the rival nationalists.//

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25X1 [redacted] //Nkomo's concern over Smith's internal settlement plan may be the most important reason for his current interest in explaining his position to the US. Nkomo may fear that Smith will turn over power to Bishop Muzorewa or Ndabaningi Sithole or to a Muzorewa-Sithole alliance. He hopes that opposition from the front-line countries will prevent such a settlement, but he may fear that the UK and the US might ultimately go along with Smith's plan. [redacted]

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ZAIRE: Ouster of Foreign Minister

25X1 [redacted] Zairian President Mobutu's firing and arrest on Saturday of Foreign Minister Nguza, the second victim of a political purge begun last week with the dismissal of Central Bank governor Sambwa, is indicative of the President's recovery from the Shaba crisis. Mobutu's purge of civilian officials appears aimed at creating scapegoats, eliminating potential rivals and their supporters, and warning critics of his one-man rule. He has already purged a number of senior military officers.

25X1 [redacted] Nguza's plight can be traced to his family ties to the Lunda people of Shaba Region. Many of the anti-Mobutu exiles who invaded Shaba from Angola in March were Lundas, and they occupied the Lunda area of western Shaba without local resistance.

25X1 [redacted] During the early weeks of the invasion--when it appeared that Mobutu might not survive the pressures unleashed by the invasion--many influential Zairians saw Nguza as a possible successor to Mobutu. The talk of Mobutu's vulnerability and Nguza's chances in fact became so widespread that Nguza issued a public statement of support for Mobutu.

25X1 [redacted] Mobutu has also charged the chief of the Lunda tribe with high treason for allegedly withholding information about the invasion plans. [redacted]

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[ ] Although Mobutu is expected to remove a number of other prominent officials, the country's basic pro-Western, anti-communist orientation is not likely to change. Mobutu's inclination toward revenge, however, may well result in a period of cooler relations with the US--which he believes offered less than full support during the Shaba crisis. At the same time, his new administration is likely to lean toward closer relations with countries that supported him--particularly France, Belgium, and a number of anti-communist Arab states.

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CYPRUS: Markarios' Successor

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[ ] Agreement among the four Greek Cypriot parties over the weekend to support Acting President Spyros Kyprianou as interim successor to President Markarios is an important step toward a smooth transition. A more accurate measure of Greek Cypriot cohesiveness will emerge in the course of the jockeying that will precede the regularly scheduled election next February.

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[ ] Acceptance of Kyprianou came only after the rightist Democratic Rally of Glafkos Clerides gave in to pressure for an uncontested interim election from the Communists, the Socialists, and Kyprianou's majority center-right Democratic Front. Clerides had wanted to succeed Makarios and feared that the malleable Kyprianou would be too responsive to the two leftist parties, which between them command up to 45 percent of the vote.

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[ ] We do not know Kyprianou's response, but he did publicly pledge to follow Makarios' policies in all fields, suggesting that he will pursue middle-of-the-road domestic policies and continue to rely primarily on the West for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

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[ ] Clerides' party will almost certainly contest the election in February unless the center and right can agree on a candidate other than Kyprianou, whose support within his own party is weak. The two leftist parties will probably push Kyprianou's candidacy. Eventually, the parties may decide to

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support a non-political personality such as Pascalis Pascalides, a respected businessman and Makarios confidant, as a compromise national unity candidate.

[ ] The Turks have reacted angrily to the stated intention of the US and other countries to recognize Makarios' successor as president of all Cyprus. Turkish officials have threatened to postpone the intercommunal talks until after the February election in the Greek Cypriot zone. [ ]

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BRIEF

South Korea - Japan:

[ ] South Korea has asked Japan to take immediate action against a group of South Korean expatriots purportedly gathered in Tokyo to establish an organization backing the South Korean opposition. Over the weekend, a brawl broke out when the gathering was disrupted by South Koreans believed to be affiliated with Mindan, the organization of South Korean residents in Japan who support South Korean President Pak.

[ ] Tokyo has been sensitive to the problem of competing South Korean groups in Japan, especially since 1974 when a South Korean resident of Japan attempted to assassinate Pak. Japanese Foreign Ministry officials have promised the South Korean government that they will carefully monitor the activities of the anti-Pak group. [ ]

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